



ELSEVIER

ScienceDirect

Journal of International Money and Finance xx (2007) 1–19

Journal of
International
Money
and Financewww.elsevier.com/locate/jimf

Regional vulnerability: The case of East Asia

Ashoka Mody ^a, Mark P. Taylor ^{b,*}^a *International Monetary Fund*^b *Barclays Global Investors, University of Warwick and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom*

Q1

Abstract

In a case study of six East Asian economies, we use dynamic factor analysis to estimate a regional component of the exchange market pressure index (EMPI) as a measure of regional financial stress. The extent to which this indicator is explained by regional economic and financial factors is interpreted as regional vulnerability to crisis. We find that regional external liabilities and exuberance in domestic stock and credit markets, as well as the US high-yield spread, were positively correlated with regional vulnerability. Individual country EMPIs are also explained by regional factors, with country-specific factors and trade linkages playing little role.

© 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

JEL classification: F31; F32; F36

Keywords: Currency crisis; Contagion; Vulnerability; Dynamic factor analysis

1. Introduction

The financial crises of the 1990s differed from those of the 1970s in a fundamental way: they tended to strike several countries simultaneously. The domino collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992–1993, the “Tequila effect” of the Mexican crisis in 1994, the “Asian flu” of 1997–1998 and the turmoil in emerging and global financial markets following the August 1998 Russian crisis all illustrate the coincidence of financial crises in the

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 2476 573008; fax: +44 2476 573013.

E-mail address: mark.taylor@warwick.ac.uk (M.P. Taylor).

Q2

48 last decade of the twentieth century. Such coincidence of crises has brought to the fore a vigor-
49 ous enquiry into the extent and reasons for interconnections between economies.

50 The starting point of the analysis in this paper is the observation that crises have tended to be
51 regional. While the events surrounding the Russian crisis in 1998 reverberated throughout the
52 world, the evidence is persuasive that countries within a geographical region are jointly vulner-
53 able (Glick and Rose, 1999; Eichengreen et al., 2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2001).

54 In this paper, we suggest a method of determining the degree of common susceptibility or vul-
55 nerability to crisis that may characterize a region, using six Asian economies and their behavior
56 before, during and after the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s as a case study.¹ In particular, we
57 pursue the idea that a region such as East Asia largely presents a common “prospectus” to
58 international investors. This may be because countries within a region follow similar development
59 strategies and economic policies (Rigobon, 1998). Combined with investors’ need to economize
60 on information gathering, as implied by models such as those presented by Calvo and Mendoza
61 (2000), groups of countries in a particular region may come to represent a single corporate entity,
62 e.g., “East Asia, Inc.”

63 Our research may be viewed in a broad sense as a contribution to the literature on contagion.
64 We prefer, however, to use the term “vulnerability” for two reasons. First, as noted by Dungey
65 and Tambakis (2003), the term “contagion” has proved to be something of an elusive concept,
66 with no single received usage (see e.g. Masson, 1999; Edwards, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart,
67 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2001; Corsetti et al., 2002). More importantly, however, we see vul-
68 nerability and contagion as two components that together form an index of common regional
69 exchange market stress. The component that is explained by movements in regional macroeco-
70 nomic and financial variables we term *vulnerability*. The component that is unexpected, based
71 on the explanatory regional variables, could be thought of as *contagion*, following, for example,
72 Masson (1999) and Edwards (2000). Vulnerability and contagion are thus related and, indeed,
73 contagion may occur because of non-linear effects or structural shifts when vulnerability levels
74 reach certain thresholds (Jeanne, 1997; Masson, 1999).

75 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the dynamic
76 factor analysis that we use to construct a regional stress index. Section 3 presents the empirical
77 results of our case study, reporting both the determinants of regional vulnerability and those of
78 country-specific EMPIs. A brief summary of the case study findings and the implications for
79 policy and future research are presented in a final section.

80

81 2. Methodological issues

82

83 The construction of our measure of regional vulnerability proceeds in three steps. First we
84 construct an index to capture the idea of devaluation probability and financial stress for each
85 country, using the well-known exchange market pressure index (EMPI). Second, we employ
86 dynamic factor analysis in order to extract the component of the EMPI that is common to all
87 six countries under examination in our case study, which can therefore be treated as a measure
88

89

90 ¹ Choosing these countries as representative of the region of East Asia immediately raises fundamental issues as to
91 what constitutes a region. For example, if this were defined purely geographically, then our analysis ought to include
92 other countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Hong Kong, etc. To include *all* countries in the geographical region would,
93 however, lead to difficulties in empirical work because it would involve the estimation of very large dynamic systems.
94 Hence, we have restricted ourselves to an examination of just six countries, but acknowledge that our research therefore
can only be interpreted as a case study of those countries.

of regional stress. Finally, we extract the component of the regional stress index that can be explained by measures of macroeconomic and financial similarity among the six countries, and interpret this explained component as our measure of regional vulnerability. We provide a more extensive discussion of the final step, including the choice of variables to use in extracting the regional vulnerability component, in our empirical section. In this section we describe in more detail first the construction of the EMPI (although only briefly, since this measure is well known) and then the dynamic factor analysis that we use to extract the regional stress index.

2.1. The exchange market pressure index

As is standard in studies of international financial crises, we begin with the well-known exchange market pressure index originally proposed by Girton and Roper (1977) in order to capture the idea of devaluation probability and financial stress. The EMPI is a weighted sum of exchange rate depreciation, loss of reserves, and rise in interest rates. It measures the pressure on the exchange rate that may in part be absorbed by a decline in reserves or through an increase in domestic interest rates. Thus, an increase in the value of a country's EMPI indicates that the net demand for that country's currency is weakening and hence that the currency may be liable to a speculative attack or that such an attack is already under way.

Formally, for a country i at time t the EMPI, denoted E_{it} , is given by:

$$E_{it} = \alpha \frac{\Delta e_{it}}{e_{it}} - \beta \frac{\Delta r_{it}}{r_{it}} + \lambda \Delta i_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where e_{it} , r_{it} and i_{it} denote, respectively, the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency), level of foreign exchange reserves and short-term interest rate for country i at time t , and Δ denotes the first-difference operator. The weights α , β and λ are chosen such that each of the three components on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) has a standard deviation of unity, in order to preclude any one of them from dominating the index.

2.2. Extracting the common factor: dynamic factor analysis

Having constructed the EMPI series, we wish to extract a factor that is common to the EMPI for each of the countries under examination as a measure of regional stress. In order to do this we employ an "unobserved components" dynamic factor analysis approach based on maximum likelihood Kalman filtering (Engle and Watson, 1981; Harvey, 1989; Cuthbertson et al., 1992). Let E_{it} be the EMPI at time t for country i , $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6$, and let κ_t be the unobserved factor common to the EMPI of all of the crisis countries. Then the general statistical system we postulate is of the form:

$$E_{it} = \gamma^{(i)} \kappa_t + n_{it}, \quad i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, \quad (2)$$

$$\Phi(L) \kappa_t = \omega_t, \quad (3)$$

$$\Psi^{(i)}(L) n_{it} = \varepsilon_{it}, \quad i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, \quad (4)$$

$$(\omega_t, \varepsilon_{1t}, \varepsilon_{2t}, \varepsilon_{3t}, \varepsilon_{4t}, \varepsilon_{5t}, \varepsilon_{6t})' \sim N[O, \text{diag}\{1, \sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \sigma_3^2, \sigma_4^2, \sigma_5^2, \sigma_6^2\}], \quad (5)$$

where $\Phi(L)$ and $\Psi^{(i)}(L)$ denote polynomials in the lag operator L , O denotes a (7×1) column vector of zeroes, and $\text{diag}\{\cdot\}$ denotes a square symmetric matrix with the elements of main

diagonal given in parentheses and zeroes elsewhere. Eq. (2) partitions the EMPI for country i at time t , E_{it} , into a factor common to all six countries, κ_t , which we can think of as the regional stress index, plus a country-specific or national factor, n_{it} . Note that κ_t is scaled by a country-specific parameter $\gamma^{(i)}$ in Eq. (2), so that the *degree* of influence of the regional stress index on the EMPI may vary from country to country. According to Eqs. (3) and (4) respectively, the regional stress and national factors are each assumed to have a finite-order autoregressive representation. This is reasonable so long as the determinants of these components are stationary and, therefore, by Wold's decomposition theorem, admit a moving average representation that may be approximated by a finite-order autoregression. Below, we shall investigate further the probable major determinants of the vulnerability factor. In Eq. (5), the distribution of the disturbance terms is assumed to be Gaussian and the variance of innovations driving the ω_t term is normalized to unity in order to identify the vulnerability factor.

If we assume that $\Phi(L)$ and $\Psi^{(i)}(L)$ are at most first-order,² then the systems (2)–(4) may be cast into state space form as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} E_{1t} \\ E_{2t} \\ E_{3t} \\ E_{4t} \\ E_{5t} \\ E_{6t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma^{(1)} & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma^{(2)} & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma^{(3)} & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma^{(4)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma^{(5)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ \gamma^{(6)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_t \\ n_{1t} \\ n_{2t} \\ n_{3t} \\ n_{4t} \\ n_{5t} \\ n_{6t} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (6)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \kappa_t \\ n_{1t} \\ n_{2t} \\ n_{3t} \\ n_{4t} \\ n_{5t} \\ n_{6t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \phi & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \psi^{(1)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \psi^{(2)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \psi^{(3)} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \psi^{(4)} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \psi^{(5)} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \psi^{(6)} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_{t-1} \\ n_{1t-1} \\ n_{2t-1} \\ n_{3t-1} \\ n_{4t-1} \\ n_{5t-1} \\ n_{6t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \omega_t \\ \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \\ \varepsilon_{3t} \\ \varepsilon_{4t} \\ \varepsilon_{5t} \\ \varepsilon_{6t} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (7)$$

or, more compactly as:

$$\Xi_t = \Gamma F_t, \quad (8)$$

$$F_t = \Lambda F_{t-1} + \zeta_t, \quad (9)$$

where

$$\zeta_t \sim N[O, \Sigma], \quad (10)$$

$$\Sigma = \text{diag}\{1, \sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \sigma_3^2, \sigma_4^2, \sigma_5^2, \sigma_6^2\}. \quad (11)$$

Once the system is in state space form, the Kalman filter recursions can be used to produce optimal estimates of the unobservable elements of the state vector F_t , conditional on maximum likelihood estimates of the state space parameters (Harvey, 1989).

² Experiments with higher-order specifications in our empirical work led to qualitatively identical and quantitatively virtually identical results.

3. Case study: six East Asian economies

3.1. Data

The data set is monthly for the period January 1990–December 2001 for six East Asian countries – Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – and was gathered from the *International Financial Statistics* database published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supplemented by *Global Data Source*, an IMF Research Department database that draws on both IMF and commercial sources. The series gathered included, for each country, the nominal (end-period) US dollar exchange rate, the level of foreign exchange reserves, nominal GDP, money supply (M2), consumer price index, a stock market index, a short-term interest rate (the interbank call-loan rate), the level of total foreign liabilities outstanding, and the level of domestic credit outstanding. In addition, a series on the US high-yield interest rate spread was obtained from Bloomberg as the difference between the yield on US high-yield bonds and the yield on the 10-year US Treasury bond; it thus measures the risk premium on less-than-investment-grade (or “junk”) bonds over the “riskless” interest rate. Finally, a data series on the spot price of oil (West Texas Intermediate) was also gathered. The reasoning underlying the choice of these variables and their use in our analysis is discussed below. All the series were expressed in mean-deviation from prior to the analysis.

3.2. Exchange market pressure indices

Fig. 1 shows the EMPIs of the six countries under examination, constructed as in Eq. (1), for the period 1990–2001. Larger values of the EMPI suggest higher stress. Negative EMPIs indicate speculators’ expectations of currency appreciation rather than depreciation. High EMPIs in some countries prior to the 1997 Asian crisis indicate that these countries had in fact been exposed to the danger of crisis but that attacks had been staved off. Fig. 1 also shows the common or regional component of the EMPI across the six countries.

3.3. The regional stress factor

The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the state space form (2)–(5) are reported in Table 1 and the implied level of common or regional stress is displayed in Fig. 1.³ The regional stress level is especially high during the height of the crisis, June 1997–January 1998. The index remains near zero or negative in most other periods except for a slight increase during the Mexican crisis in 1994. Negative values of the stress index may be interpreted as indicating regional optimism from the point of view of international investors.

The charts in Fig. 1 and the estimation results in Table 1 reveal that the regional stress factor plays an important role in driving the exchange market pressure indices of all of the East Asian countries examined. In particular, the estimated $\gamma^{(i)}$ parameters, which measure the importance of common regional stress in driving the EMPI in each country, are in every case strongly significantly different from zero at conventional nominal test sizes. The degree of variation in each country’s EMPI explained by the regional stress factor alone

³ We used the unsmoothed Kalman filter estimates of the unobservable factors, since using the smoothed estimates would introduce additional moving average structures into the factors.




Fig. 1. Exchange market pressure index.

(the R^2 statistics shown in the final column) ranges from 21% for Thailand, to 70% for the Philippines.⁴

⁴ These R^2 statistics were conducted as the coefficient of determination in a regression of the EMPI of each country onto the extracted regional stress index. Given that the regional and national components of the EMPI were constructed to be orthogonal, this gives an accurate measure of the degree of variation of the country EMPI explained by the regional factor.

Table 1
State space parameter estimation results: exchange market pressure index

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	R^2 of common component	R^2
—	—	—	Φ	0.1846	0.5143	—	—	—		
$\gamma^{(1)}$	0.4699	0.1034	$\psi^{(1)}$	0.1151	0.3045	σ_1^2	2.8836	1.0032	R_1^2	0.29
$\gamma^{(2)}$	12.4633	2.3254	$\psi^{(2)}$	0.1088	0.2098	σ_2^2	4.8749	1.9632	R_2^2	0.33
$\gamma^{(3)}$	10.5574	2.1194	$\psi^{(3)}$	0.4059	0.1174	σ_3^2	2.1963	0.9053	R_3^2	0.40
$\gamma^{(4)}$	5.0734	1.0043	$\psi^{(4)}$	0.5205	0.1947	σ_4^2	1.8764	0.8176	R_4^2	0.70
$\gamma^{(5)}$	3.7972	0.8521	$\psi^{(5)}$	0.1430	0.0221	σ_5^2	1.4137	0.6542	R_5^2	0.25
$\gamma^{(6)}$	40.5731	3.8862	$\psi^{(6)}$	0.3300	0.1241	σ_6^2	3.1115	0.6658	R_6^2	0.21

Note: R_i^2 denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable onto the extracted common factor for country i , with 1 = Indonesia, 2 = Korea, 3 = Malaysia, 4 = Philippines, 5 = Singapore, 6 = Thailand.

3.4. Analyzing the sources of vulnerability

What factors contribute to the predictable component of κ_t and hence drive regional vulnerability? In this connection, it is worth recalling that, in contrast to previous balance of payments-cum-currency crises where economic misalignment had resulted in either large fiscal deficits or gross misalignment of exchange rates, the macroeconomic performance of most of the East Asian economies prior to the 1997–1998 crisis was exemplary.⁵ Most of the countries concerned ran either balanced or surplus fiscal accounts, and high private sector savings funded internationally exceptional rates of investment. Even where rising investment surpassed savings, driving the current account into deficit, the fact that current account deficits appeared to be investment driven rather than consumption driven appeared comforting. Similarly, East Asian monetary policies appeared to be coping well before the crisis, with reported inflation rates tightly under control and strong levels of economic activity. Thus, “first-generation” and “second-generation” currency crisis models (Flood and Marion, 1999) were not seen as appropriate indicators of the range of fundamental variables to consider.

Instead, therefore, our choice of potentially influential fundamental variables was largely informed by the literature on the widely held “moral hazard” or “third generation” view of the underlying causes of the East Asian crisis (see e.g. McKinnon and Pill, 1996; Krugman, 1998; Corsetti et al., 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Agénor et al., 1999; Samo and Taylor, 1999a).⁶ According to the “moral hazard” view, a crucial role in the East Asian crisis was played by financial intermediaries whose liabilities were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, but which were essentially unregulated. This therefore created a moral hazard problem, in which financial intermediaries were able to raise money at low rates of interest and then lend it at much higher rates to finance risky investments, thereby generating strong asset price inflation, sustained by a circular process in which the proliferation of risky lending drove up the prices of risky assets, making the financial condition of these institutions appear to be

⁵ Chinn (2000) examines a group of East Asian currencies immediately prior to the 1997–1998 crisis and concludes that only the Thai baht shows evidence of external overvaluation relative, based on traditional purchasing power parity and monetary fundamentals, whilst Chinn (1999) and Chinn and Dooley (1999) find slightly more mixed results.

⁶ The “insurance model” of crisis due originally to Dooley (1997) and analyzed empirically by Chinn et al. (1999) also suggests that asset market booms are likely to be followed by capital flight and that rapid expansion of domestic credit and foreign liabilities will tend to be associated with currency crises.

330 sounder than it actually was. At some point, however, the bubble bursts and the mechanics of the
331 crisis are then described by the same circular process in reverse: asset prices begin to fall; making
332 the insolvency of financial intermediaries highly visible; forcing them to cease operations and
333 generating increasingly fast asset price deflation; leading to actual or incipient capital flight as
334 asset prices collapse.

335 This description appears to fit the facts of the East Asian crisis well (Sarno and Taylor,
336 1999a), and suggests that movements in asset prices and measures of financial imbalance would
337 be strong candidates to explain regional vulnerability. Indeed, financial imbalances in many of
338 the crisis countries had created increasingly illiquid and insolvent corporate and banking
339 sectors.

340 For these reasons, we examined external and domestic financial variables that could reflect
341 such regional vulnerabilities. The corporate and financial sector imbalances developed due to
342 the nexus of three factors: the inflow of reversible foreign capital, which created both maturity
343 and currency mismatches; the accumulation of domestic private debt; and weak financial reg-
344 ulation and opaque reporting practices, which contributed to excessive investment in unproduc-
345 tive assets. Capital inflows *per se* do not create financial instability, but when these inflows
346 serve as a main source by which to fund high levels of domestic credit, reliance on them could
347 render the market vulnerable because of the high degree of reversibility of portfolio flows and
348 bank lending (Sarno and Taylor, 1999a,b). Thus, a growing stock of external liabilities is clearly
349 a source of concern to investors. Second, domestic credit growth, and in particular real domes-
350 tic credit growth, can be associated with unproductive investments and, thus, viewed as unsus-
351 tainable. There appears to be some empirical support for this view; Kaminsky and Reinhart
352 (1999), for example, show that rapid growth of domestic credit helps predict financial crisis,
353 and rapid domestic credit growth also finds a role in various post-mortem accounts of the Asian
354 crisis (e.g. Bank for International Settlements, 1998, Chapter VII).⁷

355 Similarly, to the extent that a boom in stock market prices, adjusted for inflation, is not based
356 on fundamentals, it could similarly raise concerns with respect to future vulnerability. Kamin-
357 sky et al. (1998) and Sarno and Taylor (1999a), for example, provide strong empirical evidence
358 that stock market booms tend to precurse future exchange rate crises for a number of East Asian
359 countries.

360 We also include a “global” risk factor, the US high-yield spread, on the basis that this is not
361 only a proxy for international investors’ attitude towards risk, but also a leading indicator of US
362 economic activity (Gertler and Lown, 1999; Mody and Taylor, 2003, 2004). Gertler and Lown
363 (1999), reasoning on the basis of the theory of the “financial accelerator”, argue that a rise in
364 the spread (and, hence, in the external costs of borrowing) reflects a lowering of the collateral
365 value that borrowing firms can offer. In turn, this reduced collateral results from downgrading
366 of growth prospects. Since exports to the United States play an important role in East Asian
367 economic activity, it is not surprising that the prospect of a slowdown in the US reduces the
368 net demand for East Asian currencies. Mody and Taylor (2002) find that a rise in US high-yield
369

370
371
372
373
374
375
376

⁷ Chinn and Dooley (1997) find some evidence that rapid expansion of bank lending increases the riskiness of marginal projects for a set of Pacific Rim countries. In an analysis of EMPI movements for several emerging market economies, Tanner (2001, p. 318) finds that growth of domestic credit and a rise in the EMPI have gone together. He notes, for example, that starting around mid-1997, both the EMPI and domestic credit rose in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, “suggesting that the crises were foreshadowed by a period of loose monetary policy.”

spread leads to a significant curtailment of capital flows to emerging markets (and, indeed, its influence overshadows that of US interest rates).

In short, therefore, the final set of macroeconomic and financial variables that we settled on as potential drivers of the degree of vulnerability for these six East Asian economies included percentage monthly changes in the real (consumer price index-deflated) stock market index, the level of total foreign liabilities as a proportion of GDP, the ratio of M2 money supply to GDP (inverse velocity), and percentage monthly changes in the level of domestic credit outstanding in real terms. In order to obtain a measure of regional similarity in these macroeconomic fundamentals, we used the Kalman filtering method outlined above to extract a regional common factor for each of these series, and the results of this dynamic factor analysis are given in Tables 2–5. In addition, we included the US high-yield spread as well as an interaction term involving the product of the change in the high-yield spread and the regional component of growth in the real value of domestic credit and, as a further global factor, the monthly change in the spot oil price.

Having extracted the regional common factor of each of these series (except for the global variables) across the six countries concerned, we then regressed the common regional stress factor onto the current value and three lagged values of each of the macro fundamental common factors.⁸ Interestingly, all of the current values of the macro common factors appeared significant in the regression, although of the lagged common factors, only the first lag of the change in the real stock market index was significant and the oil price term did not yield an estimated coefficient significantly different from zero even at the 10% level. The resulting estimated regression equation was therefore of the form:

$$\hat{\kappa}_t = -5.2263\mu_{1t} - 3.3046\mu_{1,t-1} + 6.6139\mu_{2t} + 0.2101\mu_{3t} + 0.4288\mu_{4t} + 4.8224\mu_{5t}$$

$$(1.4762) \quad (1.4420) \quad (2.7365) \quad (0.1162) \quad (0.2017) \quad (1.8841)$$

$$R^2 = 0.26, \text{ DW} = 1.17, \text{ Chow}(> 6/97) = 0.4216, \text{ Hausman} = 0.2812, \quad (12)$$

where figures in parentheses denote estimated standard errors and where $\hat{\kappa}_t$ is the explained component of the regional stress index (i.e. regional vulnerability), μ_{1t} is the common factor of monthly log-change in real value of the stock market index, μ_{2t} is the common factor of logarithm of ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP, μ_{3t} is the common factor of logarithm of ratio of M2 to GDP, μ_{4t} is the common factor of monthly log-change in real value of domestic credit, μ_{5t} is the monthly change in the US high-yield spread multiplied by μ_{4t} , R^2 is the coefficient of determination, DW is the Durbin–Watson statistic, Chow(>6/97) is the p -value of a Chow test

⁸ Note that the estimated standard errors in these equations are conditional on the estimated state space parameters as the extracted common factors are generated regressors. In principle, this could have been avoided by combining the state space form for the EMPs and for the each of the macro fundamental variables into a single state space form and estimating all of the state space parameters and the factor loadings in a single step. (This system could also be extended to allow for a common shock that impacts upon all markets – see Dungey et al., 2002.) Indeed, we did spend some time in attempting to estimate this system. The problem with this approach in practice is that it involves extremely high dimensionality of the resulting state space form and a very large number of unknown parameters to be estimated simultaneously (approximately 100). This initially generated a severe problem with available computer memory; this was eventually overcome but the maximum likelihood Kalman filtering estimation procedure did not prove stable with such a high-dimensional system. This remains a possible avenue for future research, however.

Table 2
State space parameter estimation results: real stock market changes

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	R^2 of common component	R^2
—	—	—	Φ	0.4426	0.2033	—	—	—		
$\gamma^{(1)}$	0.9472	0.4176	$\psi^{(1)}$	0.0855	0.0321	σ_1^2	0.0135	0.0052	R_1^2	0.35
$\gamma^{(2)}$	8.0237	2.3764	$\psi^{(2)}$	0.0320	0.0118	σ_2^2	0.0090	0.0042	R_2^2	0.39
$\gamma^{(3)}$	9.9100	2.8345	$\psi^{(3)}$	0.0847	0.0203	σ_3^2	0.0068	0.0033	R_3^2	0.55
$\gamma^{(4)}$	16.6847	6.3754	$\psi^{(4)}$	0.2322	0.1008	σ_4^2	0.0052	0.0022	R_4^2	0.80
$\gamma^{(5)}$	6.8947	1.1435	$\psi^{(5)}$	0.1090	0.0347	σ_5^2	0.1827	0.0662	R_5^2	0.55
$\gamma^{(6)}$	35.3404	9.7312	$\psi^{(6)}$	0.2175	0.1020	σ_6^2	0.3077	0.1442	R_6^2	0.54

Note: R_i^2 denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable onto the extracted common factor for country i , with 1 = Indonesia, 2 = Korea, 3 = Malaysia, 4 = Philippines, 5 = Singapore, 6 = Thailand.

for a structural break in the parameters after June 1997, and Hausman is the p -value of a Hausman (1978) test for exogeneity of the current-dated regressors.⁹

It is interesting to note that similarity in financial indicators is capable of explaining 26% of the variation in the regional stress index, and that indicators such as the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP, inverse velocity and changes in the level of real domestic credit enter with significant and positive coefficients.¹⁰ Note also, that a test for a structural break after June 1997 (the onset of the East Asian crisis) is insignificant. Most interestingly, the interaction of the change in real domestic credit and the US high-yield spread enters positively and significantly. Thus, to the extent that credit growth *in excess of inflation* implies a loose monetary policy, as suggested by Tanner (2001), or is associated with likelihood of unproductive investments, the implication is that such domestic vulnerability is aggravated by the joint effects of a larger premium being required by international investors for holding risky assets, and by the prediction of poorer export prospects on account of slower expected US growth which a rise in the high-yield spread predicts. The fitted values from this estimation seem to track well the actual values of the regional stress index (Fig. 2, panel a). Note also that there does not appear to be any strong evidence of endogeneity of the right-hand-side regressors on the basis of a Hausman (1978) specification test. This is important because one might suspect that causality may at times run from, say, a rise in regional stress to movements in the stock market or even in the US high-yield spread, rather than vice versa. However, these reverse-causation effects do not appear to be strongly statistically significant.

One shortcoming of this estimated equation, however, is the evidence of the first-order serial correlation, as shown by the low value of the Durbin–Watson statistic, even though we included lagged values of the macro fundamental variables. Accordingly, we re-estimated the equation with one lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side. This led to the lagged change in the real stock market index and the inverse velocity factor becoming insignificant, so that the resulting final equation was:

⁹ The Hausman test for exogeneity of the regressors was constructed using the method suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), with two lagged values of all variables in Eq. (12) (or, below, Eq. (13)) used as the instrument set.

¹⁰ The estimated standard errors in this equation should be treated with caution since they are conditional on the estimates of the parameters of the state space form that was used to construct the generated regressors. See footnote 8.

Table 3

State space parameter estimation results: ratio of total foreign liabilities to nominal GDP

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	R^2 of common component	R^2
—	—	—	Φ	0.6034	0.2334	—	—	—		
$\gamma^{(1)}$	1.7771	0.5621	$\psi^{(1)}$	0.2152	0.1123	σ_1^2	0.2123	0.1003	R_1^2	0.29
$\gamma^{(2)}$	3.2213	1.1331	$\psi^{(2)}$	0.2981	0.1432	σ_2^2	0.2621	0.1326	R_2^2	0.26
$\gamma^{(3)}$	4.1239	2.0003	$\psi^{(3)}$	0.2315	0.1183	σ_3^2	0.0981	0.0224	R_3^2	0.23
$\gamma^{(4)}$	8.9991	3.1123	$\psi^{(4)}$	0.2411	0.1221	σ_4^2	0.0991	0.0221	R_4^2	0.11
$\gamma^{(5)}$	5.6673	2.1561	$\psi^{(5)}$	0.2318	0.1010	σ_5^2	0.4146	0.2153	R_5^2	0.05
$\gamma^{(6)}$	9.8899	4.6391	$\psi^{(6)}$	0.3159	0.1235	σ_6^2	0.4733	0.2236	R_6^2	0.20

Note: R_i^2 denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable onto the extracted common factor for country i , with 1 = Indonesia, 2 = Korea, 3 = Malaysia, 4 = Philippines, 5 = Singapore, 6 = Thailand.

$$\hat{\kappa}_t = -3.4443\mu_{1t} + 5.6152\mu_{2t} + 0.2012\mu_{4t} + 5.1735\mu_{5t} + 0.5169\kappa_{t-1}$$

$$(1.3072) \quad (2.3456) \quad (0.0918) \quad (1.7651) \quad (0.0729)$$

$$R^2 = 0.43, \quad h = 0.74, \quad \text{Chow}(> 6/97) = 0.5357, \quad \text{Hausman} = 0.2134.$$

The increase in the goodness of fit and the improved dynamic correspondence between the fitted estimates (i.e. the vulnerability index) and the actual values of the regional stress index is perhaps not surprising (Fig. 2, panel b); the first-order serial correlation has, however, disappeared (the statistic $h = 0.74$, is Durbin's h statistic¹¹) and again there is no sign of a structural break post-June 1997 on the basis of Chow test and the Hausman test does not reject exogeneity of the regressors.¹² Also, we once more see that the interaction term involving the product of the US high-yield spread and changes in the real level of domestic credit enters strongly significantly.

In Fig. 2, panel c we have graphed the contribution of the interaction term in Eq. (13) (i.e. $5.1735\mu_{5t}$) together with the regional stress index itself: clearly, the interaction term tracks the regional stress index well, especially around the 1997–1998 crisis period. Growth in the real value of domestic credit clearly had a strong influence on regional financial stress, especially in combination with a rising value of the US high-yield spread.

3.5. The dynamic interaction of regional stress and common macro fundamentals

We next investigated the dynamic interaction between the regional stress index and the macro similarity variables by estimating small vector autoregressions (VARs). Our investigation of the relationship between macroeconomic and financial similarity and vulnerability (i.e. the component of regional stress which could be explained by the fundamentals) indicated the importance of the interaction between domestic credit and changes in the US high-yield spread. In estimating a VAR, however, since our ultimate aim was to produce impulse–response functions for the

¹¹ Durbin's h statistic, which is valid in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, is distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation of the residuals.

¹² It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (0.5169) is much higher than the estimated simple first-order autocorrelation coefficient resulting from the dynamic factor analysis reported in Table 1 (0.1846). On reflection, however, the fact that the two coefficients differ is not surprising since, given Eq. (12) and the autocorrelation of the regional stress index, the lagged dependent variable is clearly correlated with the other regressors in Eq. (13).

Table 4

State space parameter estimation results: changes in real domestic credit

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	R^2 of common component	R^2
—	—	—	Φ	0.4510	0.2031	—	—	—		
$\gamma^{(1)}$	0.7018	0.3113	$\psi^{(1)}$	0.1296	0.0431	σ_1^2	0.0130	0.0067	R_1^2	0.79
$\gamma^{(2)}$	10.0446	3.4221	$\psi^{(2)}$	0.5063	0.2249	σ_2^2	0.3279	0.1432	R_2^2	0.11
$\gamma^{(3)}$	7.8648	2.6425	$\psi^{(3)}$	0.2085	0.1127	σ_3^2	0.4740	0.2034	R_3^2	0.13
$\gamma^{(4)}$	7.9067	2.7447	$\psi^{(4)}$	0.1083	0.0623	σ_4^2	0.8598	0.4256	R_4^2	0.17
$\gamma^{(5)}$	4.3942	1.2151	$\psi^{(5)}$	0.2197	0.1134	σ_5^2	0.9364	0.3346	R_5^2	0.15
$\gamma^{(6)}$	12.4753	5.3344	$\psi^{(6)}$	0.5359	0.2615	σ_6^2	0.5465	0.2352	R_6^2	0.32

Note: R_i^2 denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable onto the extracted common factor for country i , with 1 = Indonesia, 2 = Korea, 3 = Malaysia, 4 = Philippines, 5 = Singapore, 6 = Thailand.

regional stress index in response to shocks to the macroeconomic and financial similarity variables, we were reluctant to include *both* changes in domestic credit *and* the interaction term in the same VAR since this would make interpretation of the impulse–response functions problematic because of the non-linear relationship between these two variables. Accordingly, we estimated two systems: System 1, which included the regional stress index (κ_t) and the regional common factors of the changes in the real stock market index (μ_{1t}), of the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP (μ_{2t}), and the interaction between changes in the high-yield spread and the common factor of changes in real domestic credit (μ_{5t}); and System 2, which included κ_t , μ_{1t} , μ_{2t} and the regional common factor of changes in real domestic credit, μ_{4t} .¹³

We estimated a first-order VAR for both systems.¹⁴ We then used the estimated VARs to construct impulse–response functions.¹⁵ We have graphed the response of the regional stress index to shocks to itself and to each of the three macro similarity variables derived from Systems 1 and 2 in Fig. 3. These impulse–response functions can in fact be interpreted as the response of *regional vulnerability* to innovations in each of the fundamental variables since, by definition, movements in the regional stress index which are explained by movements in the fundamentals are in fact the same as movements in vulnerability.

Interestingly, the impulse–response of regional stress with respect to shocks to itself and to μ_{1t} and μ_{2t} seems little affected by the choice of VAR and, moreover, each of the impulse–response functions show an interesting pattern capable of entirely intuitive interpretation. The impulse–response of the regional stress index to own shocks mean reverts toward zero with

¹³ In fact, we found that the impulse–response functions obtained with all the variables, including both μ_{4t} and μ_{5t} , in the VAR were qualitatively extremely similar to those we report below for the two separate systems, which is not surprising since μ_{4t} and μ_{5t} do not have a high degree of *linear* dependence. Nevertheless, we prefer to report the results obtained using the two systems, in order to make clear the interpretation of the impulse–response functions.

¹⁴ The first-order VARs appeared adequate in the sense that there was no evidence of remaining serial correlation in the residuals, although the Akaike information criterion (AIC) did in fact suggest a third-order VAR in both cases. The tendency of the AIC to overparameterize and choose higher-order VARs is, however, well known, and a first-order system did seem more consistent with the dynamic factor and regression analysis reported elsewhere in the paper. However, as a check, we also carried out the impulse–response analysis with the third-order systems and this resulted in almost identical results.

¹⁵ We used an orthogonalization of the VAR innovations based on a standard Cholesky decomposition, with the variables in the ordering $\kappa_t - \mu_{1t} - \mu_{2t} - \mu_{5t}$ for System 1 and $\kappa_t - \mu_{1t} - \mu_{2t} - \mu_{4t}$ for System 2, although alternative orderings (with κ_t first) did not materially affect the results.

Table 5
State space parameter estimation results: ratio of M2 to GDP

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	R^2 of common component	R^2
—	—	—	Φ	0.6422	0.2270	—	—	—		
$\gamma^{(1)}$	0.8156	0.3416	$\Psi^{(1)}$	0.2153	0.1013	σ_1^2	0.0177	0.0061	R_1^2	0.73
$\gamma^{(2)}$	8.1952	3.9228	$\Psi^{(2)}$	0.5155	0.2413	σ_2^2	0.3142	0.1553	R_2^2	0.41
$\gamma^{(3)}$	8.1265	3.8873	$\Psi^{(3)}$	0.2144	0.1143	σ_3^2	0.4521	0.2152	R_3^2	0.66
$\gamma^{(4)}$	6.4432	2.9853	$\Psi^{(4)}$	0.1432	0.0631	σ_4^2	0.7861	0.3734	R_4^2	0.73
$\gamma^{(5)}$	2.1123	1.0338	$\Psi^{(5)}$	0.2248	0.1133	σ_5^2	0.8355	0.3124	R_5^2	0.21
$\gamma^{(6)}$	16.8913	4.3899	$\Psi^{(6)}$	0.6349	0.2816	σ_6^2	0.5671	0.2445	R_6^2	0.67

Note: R_i^2 denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable onto the extracted common factor for country i , with 1 = Indonesia, 2 = Korea, 3 = Malaysia, 4 = Philippines, 5 = Singapore, 6 = Thailand.

a half-life of between two and three months. Since this movement is conditional on holding the macro similarity variables constant, this may be interpreted as a measure of the degree to which pure market sentiment, independent of the fundamentals, affects the regional stress index. Q4


The impulse–response of regional stress (and hence vulnerability) to movements in the stock market index is also very interesting: although the effect for the first few periods is to reduce vulnerability – consistent with our single-equation regression results – the net long-term effect is in fact to raise regional vulnerability. As would be expected, an increase in total foreign liabilities as a proportion of GDP raises vulnerability in both the short run and the long run.

Shocks to the interaction between domestic credit and changes in the high-yield spread also tend to raise the vulnerability index in both the short run and the long run. Comparing Fig. 3a and b, however, it is interesting to note that shocks to the interactive term indicate a much more acute effect on regional vulnerability in the short run than do shocks to domestic credit alone.


3.6. The role of macro similarity in explaining individual country EMPIs

The next step in our investigation was an analysis of the extent to which the common factors in the macro fundamentals are capable of explaining movements in individual country EMPIs. We did this by regressing the individual country EMPIs onto the same set of variables as in regression Eq. (13), except that the individual country lagged EMPI replaces the lagged regional stress index. The results are given in Table 6. Interestingly, in most cases the variables enter with strongly significant coefficients which are the same sign as those reported in Eq. (13).

Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 report the marginal significance level, or p -value, of an F -test of the significance of adding in the country-specific components of the macro fundamental variables into the regression, both for the post-1998 (i.e. post-crisis) period and for the pre-1999 period. In nearly every case, these p -values indicate that the national factors are insignificant in explaining movements in individual country EMPIs, although the marginal significance levels do appear to shrink post-1998, perhaps indicating a move towards greater importance of national factors. This is especially evident in the case of Thailand, which in fact has a p -value for the post-1998 period significantly less than 5%. Closer examination of the Thai regression



655 reveals that it is the national component of the change in real domestic credit that is strongly
656 significantly different from zero, with a marginal significance level of the t -ratio of the estimated
657 coefficient of 0.0003. Testing for the significance of the remaining three national factors
658 yielded a marginal significance level of 0.20.



3.7. The role of trade linkages

Finally, we examined the importance of trade linkages in explaining individual country EM-PIs, once the influence of macro similarity had been accounted for, since there has been some debate in the literature as to whether contagion may be linked to the degree of trade integration among countries (see e.g. Glick and Rose, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Forbes, 2001). To do this, we constructed measures of trade integration suggested by Fratzscher (1999).¹⁶ This variable was constructed on a monthly basis for each of the six countries under investigation, with respect to each of the other five countries, for our sample period. We then added the five trade linkage variables together for each country to provide an overall

¹⁶ See Fratzscher (1999) for details. Fratzscher's index is designed to capture both the degree of competition in third markets – which here includes industrialized countries (US, Europe and Japan), developing countries (Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Western Hemisphere), and other regions – as well as the degree of bilateral trade between countries. The first factor captures the exposure of a country to a competitor's devaluation in selling to a third market, while the second factor captures the more direct effects of devaluation on bilateral trade.

Table 6
Individual country EMPI regressions

Country	Lagged EMPI	Stock market change	Total foreign liabilities to GDP	Domestic credit change	Change in high-yield spread × domestic credit change	R^2	National factors pre-1999 p -value	National factors post-1998 p -value	Trade p -value
Indonesia	0.1727 (0.0912)	-14.0331 (6.4432)	0.2641 (0.0771)	9.5933 (3.6313)	48.3141 (16.5805)	0.18	0.8739	0.2012	0.6969
Korea	0.4597 (0.0833)	-66.6453 (26.1594)	2.2226 (1.6871)	7.1364 (3.1003)	38.3392 (20.7661)	0.23	0.9710	0.3142	0.1091
Malaysia	0.1297 (0.0817)	-66.2690 (23.0265)	1.9307 (0.9912)	11.5633 (3.9390)	18.8082 (8.4910)	0.15	0.7277	0.2561	0.7380
Philippines	0.3761 (0.1991)	-67.8627 (20.5311)	1.6647 (2.2349)	7.0759 (3.4568)	6.5373 (2.9810)	0.19	0.3841	0.1777	0.5049
Singapore	0.0336 (0.0890)	-32.7606 (12.3321)	7.4286 (3.3915)	18.1095 (5.1403)	10.0356 (4.05299)	0.18	0.1123	0.0914	0.5880
Thailand	0.0546 (0.0825)	-29.6951 (12.2843)	6.3382 (2.4313)	14.9619 (3.7293)	20.4199 (9.1238)	0.23	0.2300	0.003	0.1051

Note: Dependent variable is the individual country EMPI. Columns 2–5 give estimated coefficients for lagged EMPI and various extracted common macro factors, with standard errors given in parentheses; R^2 in column 6 gives the coefficient of determination of this regression. Column 7 gives the p -value of an F -test of the significance of adding the national components of each of the macro variables to the regression for the pre-1999 period, while column 7 gives the p -value of an F -test of the significance of adding the national components of each of the macro variables to the regression for the post-1998 period. Column 8 gives the p -value of a t -test of the significance of adding a trade linkage variable to the regression.

measure of trade linkage of each of the countries under examination with the other five countries over the sample period.¹⁷

In the final column of Table 6, we report the p -value resulting from a t -test of the significance of this variable when it is added into the EMPI regression for each of the individual countries, controlling for the international common components of the macro fundamental series. In each case, the marginal significance levels indicate that the variable is not significant at standard significance levels.

The fact that trade linkages do not appear significant in explaining movements in the EMPI over time should not, however, be taken as contradicting the findings of Glick and Rose (1999), who find that trade linkages are significant in explaining contagion. As noted earlier in our discussion, the “contagious crises” literature asks a different question from that posed in the present analysis, namely, given that a crisis has occurred, who else is most likely to be affected? In the present study, we are primarily examining the vulnerability of a region to the occurrence of a crisis.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a case study of the six Asian countries most severely affected by the 1997 currency crisis – Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea – in an analysis of the vulnerability of a region to exchange rate crisis. Our ultimate aim

¹⁷ Trade data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s *Direction of Trade Statistics*. We are grateful to Jung Yeon Kim for help in constructing these indices.

753 has been to contribute to an understanding of how crises may be prevented, rather than an under-
754 standing of how they spread.¹⁸

755 In particular, we constructed a measure of regional financial stress for these countries using
756 dynamic factor analysis which partitions the EMPIs of the six countries into a common or
757 regional component and a country-specific, idiosyncratic component. We have also shown
758 how this regional stress index can be further partitioned into a component that is predictable
759 given the underlying regional measures of macro and financial similarity (leading to a measure
760 of regional vulnerability) and a part that is unexpected based on the fundamentals (a residual
761 measure that could be interpreted as regional contagion).

762 To summarize our empirical results briefly, regional vulnerability in these six East Asian
763 countries appeared to arise in the context of regional accumulation of foreign liabilities and
764 the rapid growth of domestic credit and stock market prices. Global, or “monsoonal,” effects
765 were proxied by the rise in risk premia in financial markets, which signal also a slowdown in
766 US growth, amplifying the vulnerabilities on account of credit growth. There was no evidence
767 of a structural change in the sources of vulnerability following the Asian crisis. Our results also
768 suggest that individual country EMPIs are also explained by the common regional factors that
769 drive the level of regional vulnerability. Country-specific factors played almost no role, with the
770 exception of Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Singapore (both in the post-crisis period).

771 Our case study therefore reveals that the six countries in question were indeed characterized
772 by a pre-existing degree of common vulnerability prior to the 1997–1998 crisis. This is of
773 interest for at least two reasons. First, it aids in our understanding of the East Asian crisis. Second,
774 if this finding generalizes to other crises and geographical regions (and perhaps also to a wider
775 definition of a geographical region), then the implications for policymakers in any particular
776 country are that they need to be concerned not only about their own level of vulnerability, but
777 should also monitor and, possibly safeguard against, financial imbalances in the rest of the region.
778 For international financial institutions, multilateral surveillance takes on greater importance.

779 We end, therefore, with a call for further work on this issue. We have been careful to stress
780 that the research reported in this paper can only be interpreted as a case study of six particular
781 East Asian economies and the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Although the results of this
782 case study are illuminating and suggest that our approach is potentially of policy significance,
783 further research is necessary in order to establish the general applicability and usefulness of
784 these methods. In particular, further work might usefully test the dynamic common factor
785 approach in the context of other geographical regions (e.g. Latin America) or in the context
786 of expanding the number of countries examined.

787 788 **Uncited references**

789
790 Haley, 1978; Morck et al., 2000.

791 792 **Acknowledgements**

793
794
795 The research reported in this paper was undertaken while Mark Taylor was a Visiting
796 Scholar at the International Monetary Fund. The authors are grateful to the editor – James
797
798

799
¹⁸ See Goldstein et al. (2000) for a similar notion of “vulnerability”.

800 Lothian – to three anonymous referees and to Kristin Forbes, Antu Murshid, and Carmen Rein-
801 hart for helpful and constructive comments on a previous version. We also thank Young Kim for
802 assistance with the data. Any errors that may remain, however, are strictly the responsibility of
803 the authors. In particular, the views expressed here are the authors' own private views and
804 should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund or to any of its member countries,
805 or to Barclays Global Investors.

807 References

- 809 Agénor, P.-R., Miller, M., Vines, D., Weber, A. (Eds.), 1999. *The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Con-*
810 *sequences*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne.
- 811 Bank for International Settlements, 1998. *Annual Report*. Bank for International Settlements, Basel.
- 812 Calvo, G.A., Mendoza, E., 2000. Rational contagion and the globalization of securities markets. *Journal of International*
813 *Economics* 51, 79–113.
- 814 Chinn, M.D., 1999. On the won and other East Asian currencies. *International Journal of Finance and Economics* 4,
815 113–127.
- 816 Chinn, M.D., 2000. Before the fall: were East Asian currencies overvalued? *Emerging Markets Review* 1, 101–126.
- 817 Chinn, M.D., Dooley, M.P., 1997. Asia-Pacific capital markets: measurement of integration and the implications for eco-
818 nomic activity. In: Ito, T., Krueger, A.O. (Eds.), *Regionalism versus Multilateral Trading Arrangements*. Chicago
819 University Press, Chicago.
- 820 Chinn, M.D., Dooley, M.P., 1999. International monetary arrangements in the Asia-Pacific before and after. *Journal of*
821 *Asian Economics* 10, 361–384.
- 822 Chinn, M.D., Dooley, M.P., Shrestha, S., 1999. Latin America and East Asia in the context of an insurance model of
823 currency crises. *Journal of International Money and Finance* 18, 659–681.
- 824 Corsetti, G., Pericoli, M., Sbracia, M., 2002. Some contagion, some interdependence: more pitfalls in the tests of finan-
825 cial contagion. Unpublished Working Paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
- 826 Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., Roubini, N., 1999. The Asian crisis: an overview of the empirical evidence and policy debate.
827 In: Agénor, P.-R., Miller, M., Vines, D., Weber, A. (Eds.), *The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Con-*
828 *sequences*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne.
- 829 Cuthbertson, K., Hall, S.G., Taylor, M.P., 1992. *Applied Econometric Techniques*. University of Michigan Press, Ann
830 Arbor.
- 831 Davidson, R., MacKinnon, J.G., 1993. *Estimation and Inference in Econometrics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and
832 New York.
- 833 Dooley, M.P., 1997. A model of crises in emerging markets. International Finance Discussion Paper No. 630. Board of
834 Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC.
- 835 Dungey, M., Fry, R., González-Hermosillo, B., Martin, V.L., 2002. International contagion effects from the Russian
836 crisis and the LTCM near-collapse. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 02/74.
- 837 Dungey, M., Tambakis, D.N., 2003. International financial contagion: what do we know? Unpublished Working Paper,
838 Australian National University, Canberra, ACT.
- 839 Edwards, S., 2000. Contagion. *World Economy* 23, 873–900.
- 840 Eichengreen, B., Hale, G., Mody, A., 2001. Flight to quality: investor risk tolerance and the spread of emerging market
841 crises. In: Claessens, S., Forbes, K.J. (Eds.), *International Financial Contagion*. Kluwer Academic, Boston, MA.
- 842 Engle, R.F., Watson, M.F., 1981. A one-factor multivariate time-series model of metropolitan wage rates. *Journal of the*
843 *American Statistical Association* 76, 774–781.
- 844 Flood, R.F., Marion, N., 1999. Perspectives on the recent currency crisis literature. *International Journal of Finance and*
845 *Economics* 4, 1–26.
- 846 Forbes, K.J., 2001. Are trade linkages important determinants of country vulnerability to crises? National Bureau of
847 Economic Research Working Paper No. 8194, Cambridge, MA.
- 848 Forbes, K.J., Rigobon, R., 2001. Measuring contagion: conceptual and empirical issues. In: Claessens, S., Forbes, K.J.
849 (Eds.), *International Financial Contagion*. Kluwer Academic, Boston, MA.
- 850 Fratzscher, M., 1999. What causes currency crisis: sunspots, vulnerability or fundamentals? Unpublished Working Pa-
851 per, European University Institute, Florence.
- 852 Gertler, M., Lown, C., 1999. The information in the high-yield bond spread for the business cycle: evidence and some
853 implications. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 15, 132–150.

- 847 Girton, L., Roper, D., 1977. A monetary model of exchange market pressure applied to the postwar Canadian experi-
848 ence. *American Economic Review* 67, 537–548.
- 849 Glick, R., Rose, A., 1999. Contagion and trade: why are currency crises regional? *Journal of International Money and*
850 *Finance* 8, 603–617.
- 851 Goldstein, M., Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., 2000. Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for
852 Emerging Markets. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
- 853 Haley, B., 1978. *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- 854 Harvey, A.C., 1989. Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter. Cambridge University Press,
855 Cambridge, New York and Melbourne.
- 856 Hausman, J., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. *Econometrica* 46, 1251–1271.
- 857 Jeanne, O., 1997. Are currency crises self-fulfilling? A test. *Journal of International Economics* 43, 263–286.
- 858 Kaminsky, G.L., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C.M., 1998. Leading indicators of currency crises. *International Monetary Fund*
859 *Staff Papers* 45, 1–48.
- 860 Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., 1999. The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems.
861 *American Economic Review* 89, 473–500.
- 862 Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., 2000. On crises, contagion, and confusion. *Journal of International Economics* 51 (1),
863 145–168.
- 864 Krugman, P., 1998. What happened to Asia? Unpublished Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
865 Cambridge, MA.
- 866 Masson, P., 1999. Contagion: monsoonal effects, spillovers, and jumps between multiple equilibria. In: Agénor, P.-R.,
867 Miller, M., Vines, D., Weber, A. (Eds.), *The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Consequences*. Cam-
868 bridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne.
- 869 McKinnon, R., Pill, H., 1996. Credible liberalizations and international capital flows: the overborrowing syndrome. In:
870 Ito, T., Krueger, A.O. (Eds.), *Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia*. Chicago University Press,
871 Chicago, IL.
- 872 Mody, A., Taylor, M.P., 2002. International capital crunches: the time-varying role of informational asymmetries.
873 *International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 02/43*, Washington, DC.
- 874 Mody, A., Taylor, M.P., 2003. The high-yield spread as a predictor of real economic activity: evidence of a financial
875 accelerator for the United States. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* 50, 373–402.
- 876 Mody, A., Taylor, M.P., 2004. Financial predictors of real activity and the financial accelerator. *Economics Letters* 82,
877 167–172.
- 878 ~~Morek, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W., 2000. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have syn-~~
879 ~~chronous stock price movements? *Journal of Financial Economics* 58, 215–260.~~
- 880 Rigobon, R., 1998. Informational speculative attacks: good news is no news. Unpublished Working Paper, Massachu-
881 setts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
- 882 Sarno, L., Taylor, M.P., 1999a. Moral hazard, asset price bubbles, capital flows and the East Asian crisis: the first tests.
883 *Journal of International Money and Finance* 18, 637–657.
- 884 Sarno, L., Taylor, M.P., 1999b. Hot money, accounting labels and the permanence of capital flows to developing coun-
885 tries: an empirical investigation. *Journal of Development Economics* 59, 337–364.
- 886 Tanner, E., 2001. Exchange market pressure and monetary policy: Asia and Latin America in the 1990s. *International*
887 *Monetary Fund Staff Papers* 47, 311–333.
- 888 Taylor, M.P., 1999. Contagion and trade: why are currency crises regional? Discussion of Glick and Rose. In:
889 Agénor, P.-R., Miller, M., Vines, D., Weber, A. (Eds.), *The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Conse-*
890 *quences*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne.
- 891 Van Rijckeghem, C., Weder, B., 2001. Sources of contagion: is it finance or trade? *Journal of International Economics*
892 54, 293–308.